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Abstract
Due to its high performance and decreasing cost per bit,
flash is becoming the main storage medium in datacen-
ters for hot data. However, flash endurance is a perpet-
ual problem, and due to technology trends, subsequent
generations of flash devices exhibit progressively shorter
lifetimes before they experience uncorrectable bit errors.
In this paper we propose extending flash lifetime by
allowing devices to expose higher bit error rates. To do
so, we present DIRECT, a novel set of policies that lever-
ages latent redundancy in distributed storage systems to
recover from bit corruption errors with minimal perfor-
mance and recovery overhead. In doing so, DIRECT can
significantly extend the lifetime of flash devices by ef-
fectively utilizing these devices even after they begin ex-
posing bit errors.
We implemented DIRECT on two real-world storage
systems: ZippyDB, a distributed key-value store backed
by RocksDB, and HDFS, a distributed file system. When
tested on production traces at Facebook, DIRECT re-
duces application-visible error rates in ZippyDB by more
than 102 and recovery time by more than 104. DIRECT
also allows HDFS to tolerate a 104–105 higher bit error
rate without experiencing application-visible errors.
1 Introduction
Flash is rapidly becoming the dominant storage medium
for hot data in datacenters [50, 57], since it offers sig-
nificantly lower latency and higher throughput than hard
disks. Many storage systems are built atop flash, includ-
ing databases [6, 9, 13, 33], caches [5, 43, 44, 61], and
file systems [37, 53].
However, a perennial problem of flash is its limited
endurance, or how long it can reliably correct raw bit er-
rors. As device writes are the main contributor to flash
wear, this lifetime is measured in the number of writes or
program-erase (P/E) cycles the device can tolerate before
exceeding an uncorrectable bit error threshold. Uncor-
rectable bit errors are device errors that are exposed to
the application and occur when there are too many raw
bit errors for the device to correct.
In hyper-scale datacenter environments, operators
constantly seek to reduce flash wear by limiting flash
writes [19, 50]. At Facebook for example, a dedicated
team monitors application flash writes to ensure they
do not prematurely exceed manufacturer-defined device
lifetimes. To make matters worse, each subsequent flash
generation tolerates a smaller number of writes before
reaching end-of-life (see Figure 1a) [31]. Further, given
the scaling challenges of DRAM [38, 42], and the in-
creasing cost gap between DRAM and flash [1, 28],
many operators are migrating services from DRAM to
flash [7, 27].
There is a variety of work that attempts to extend flash
lifetime by delaying the onset of bit errors [6, 10, 25, 36,
45, 47, 48, 60, 63, 64]. This paper takes the opposite ap-
proach. We observe that flash endurance can be extended
by allowing devices to go beyond their advertised uncor-
rectable bit error rate (UBER) and embracing the use of
flash disks at much higher error rates. To do so how-
ever, distributed storage systems must be retrofitted with
a new paradigm that does not assume corruption-free de-
vices. Google recently released a whitepaper suggesting
a similar approach [23].
Traditionally, distributed storage systems are built to
tolerate machine or disk failures, not bit corruption on an
individual data block. To recover from machine failures,
storage systems re-replicate an entire server, but such
heavy-handed recovery is inappropriate for handling er-
rors that may affect only a single bit. Instead, our key in-
sight is that minimizing error amplification, or the num-
ber of bits needed to recover a bit error, enables us to
use corruption-prone devices by reducing the probabil-
ity of application-visible errors and improving recovery
performance.
We introduce Distributed error Isolation and RECov-
ery Techniques (DIRECT), which is rooted in the obser-
vation that (1) datacenter storage systems replicate data
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(a) Existing hardware-based error correction.
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(b) Augmenting existing error correction with DIRECT.
Figure 1: For each generation of flash bit density, the average number of P/E cycles after which the uncorrectable bit error rate
falls below the manufacturer specified level (10−15). Beyond MLC, flash becomes constrained to read-heavy applications [24].
With current hardware-based error correction, with QLC technology and beyond, flash becomes almost unusable [20, 49, 52].
DIRECT enables the adoption of denser flash technologies because errors can be handled by the distributed storage application.
The uncorrectable bit error rate that can be tolerated by DIRECT was computed using the model from §3.1, while the uncorrectable
bit error rate to P/E conversion was computed using data from a Google study [57].
on remote servers, and (2) this redundancy can correct
bit error rates orders of magnitude beyond the hardware
error correction mechanisms implemented on the device.
DIRECT is a set of three simple general-purpose policies
that, when implemented, enable distributed storage sys-
tems to achieve high availability and correctness in the
face of uncorrectable bit errors:
1. Minimize error amplification. DIRECT detects
errors using existing error detection mechanisms
(e.g., checksums) and recovers data from remote
servers at the smallest possible granularity.
2. Local metadata protection. To recover from a cor-
ruption in local metadata (e.g., database index), of-
ten a large amount of data must be re-replicated.
DIRECT avoids this by adding local redundancy to
local metadata.
3. Safe recovery semantics. Any recovery operations
on corrupted data must be serialized against concur-
rent read and write operations with respect to the
system’s consistency guarantees.
We design and implement the DIRECT policies in
two popular systems that are illustrative of widely-used
storage architectures: (1) ZippyDB, a distributed key-
value store used in production at Facebook and backed
by RocksDB, a popular storage engine based on the
log-structured merge tree [54], and (2) the Hadoop Dis-
tributed File System (HDFS), which is representative of
distributed storage systems that perform full-block repli-
cation. In both systems, we minimize error amplification
by isolating bit errors to data regions with sizes on the
order of kilobytes, making recovery very fast compared
to re-replication of an entire server.
DIRECT enables HDFS to tolerate much higher bit er-
ror rates because blocks in HDFS are immutable after
write, so DIRECT fixes bit errors by comparing across
replicas of the same block (§4.2). On the other hand,
recovery is challenging in RocksDB due to background
compaction operations and key-versioning. Compaction
makes it difficult not only to find the corrupted region on
one replica in another replica (different servers store the
same key-value pairs in different files), but also to ensure
that the recovered key-value pairs have consistent ver-
sions. DIRECT must make use of the distributed layer in
ZippyDB to solve both these problems (§4.1.4).
Applying DIRECT results in significant end-to-end
improvements: it reduces application-visible error rates
in ZippyDB by more than 100×, reduces recovery time
by 10,000×, and reduces CPU consumption by 20%-
49%. It enables HDFS to tolerate bit error rates that are
10,000×-100,000× greater.
With these performance improvements, DIRECT can
lead to significant increases in device lifetime, because it
maintains the same probability of application-visible er-
rors at much higher device UBERs (for the computation,
see §3.1). An estimate of lifetime increase is shown in
Figure 1b; we estimate the number of P/E cycles gained
by running to higher UBERs from a Google study [57].
Depending on the system parameters, DIRECT can in-
crease the lifetime of devices by 10-100×. This allows
datacenter operators to replace flash devices less often
and adopt lower cost-per-bit flash technologies that have
lower endurance. DIRECT also provides the opportu-
nity to rethink the design of existing flash-based storage
systems, which are brittle in the face of corruption er-
rors. Furthermore, while this paper focuses on flash, DI-
RECT’s principles also apply in other storage mediums,
including NVM and hard disks.
In summary, this paper makes several contributions:
1. We observe that flash lifetime can be extended by
allowing devices to expose higher bit error rates.
2. We propose DIRECT, general-purpose software
policies that enable storage systems to maintain per-
formance and high availability in the face of high
hardware bit error rates.
3. We design and implement DIRECT in two repre-
sentative storage systems, ZippyDB and HDFS.
4. We demonstrate that DIRECT significantly speeds
up recovery time due to disk corruptions, and signif-
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icantly lowers application-observable errors in the
resulting systems, allowing them to tolerate much
higher hardware bit error rates.
2 Motivation
What Limits Flash Endurance? Flash chips are com-
posed of memory cells, each of which stores an analog
voltage value. The flash controller reads the value stored
in a certain memory cell by sensing the voltage level of
the cell and applying quantization to determine the dis-
crete value in bits. The more bits stored in a cell, the
narrower the voltage range that maps to each discrete bit,
so more precise voltage sensing is required to get a cor-
rect read. Unfortunately, one of the primary ways to re-
duce cost per bit is to increase the number of bits per
cell, which means that even small voltage perturbations
can result in a misread.
Multiple factors cause voltage drift in a flash cell.
The dominant source, especially in datacenter settings
where most data is “hot,” is the program-erase (P/E) cy-
cle, which involves applying a large high voltage to the
cell in order to drain its stored charge, thus wearing the
insulating layer in the flash cell [25]. This increases the
voltage drift in subsequent values in the cell, which grad-
ually leads to bit errors.
3D NAND is a recent technology that has been
adopted for further increasing flash density by stacking
cells vertically. While 3D NAND relaxes physical limi-
tations of 2D NAND (traditional flash) by enabling verti-
cal stacking, 3D NAND inherits the reliability problems
of 2D NAND, and further exacerbates them, since a cell
in 3D NAND has more adjacent (vertical) neighbors. For
example, voltage retention is worse, because voltage can
now leak in three dimensions [40, 51]. Similarly, dis-
turb errors that occur when adjacent cells are read or pro-
grammed are also exacerbated [39, 59].
Existing Hardware Reliability Mechanisms. To cor-
rect bit errors, flash devices use error correcting codes
(ECC), which are implemented in hardware. After the
ECC pass, there could still be incorrect bits on the page.
To address these errors, SSDs also employ internal RAID
across the dies inside the flash device [14, 17]. After ap-
plying coding and RAID within the device, there will re-
main a certain rate of uncorrectable bit errors (UBER).
Together, ECC and internal RAID mechanisms can drive
the error rates of SSDs from the raw bit error rate of
around 10−6 down to the 10−17 to 10−20 UBER range
typical of enterprise SSDs [12]. “Commodity” SSD de-
vices typically guarantee an UBER of 10−15.
However, the level of RAID striping is constant across
generations, because the number of dies inside a flash
device remains constant. This means that the corrective
power of RAID is fixed. While it is possible to create
stronger ECC engines, the higher the corrective power of
the ECC, the more costly the device due to the complex-
ity of the ECC circuit [4, 8].
Implications of Limited Flash Endurance. Flash tech-
nology has already reached the point where its endurance
is inhibiting its adoption and operation in various data-
center use cases. For example, QLC was recently intro-
duced as the next generation flash cell technology. How-
ever, it can only tolerate 100-200 P/E cycles [20, 49, 52],
so it can only be used for read-heavy use cases. Datacen-
ter applications that deal with hot data, such as databases
and analytics, typically need to update objects frequently.
This has limited the adoption of QLC (and is the rea-
son that Facebook has avoided QLC flash). Subsequent
cell technology generations will suffer from even greater
problems. Second, operational issues often dictate a de-
vice’s usage lifetime. While flash manufacturers are con-
servative with their flash device lifetimes [57], flash is
still only used for its advertised lifetime to simplify op-
erational complexity. Further, in a hyper-scale datacen-
ter where it is common to source devices from multiple
vendors, the most conservative estimate of device life-
time across vendors is typically chosen as the lifetime
for a fleet of flash devices, so that the entire fleet can
be installed and removed together. However, if the dis-
tributed storage layer could tolerate much higher device
error rates, then datacenter operators would no longer
have to make conservative and wasteful estimates about
entire fleets of flash devices.
Third, because of the increase in DRAM prices due
to its scaling challenges and tight supply [1, 28, 38, 42],
datacenter operators are migrating services from DRAM
to flash [7, 27]. This means that flash will be responsi-
ble for many more workloads, further exacerbating the
flash endurance problem. Limited flash lifetime is al-
ready a problem in the datacenter, where operators must
limit applications to a certain write throughput per day to
prevent prematurely wearing out a device.
3 DIRECT Design
DIRECT is a set of policies that enables a distributed
storage system to maintain high availability and correct-
ness in the face of a high UBER. We define a distributed
storage system as a set of many local stores coupled with
a distributed protocol layer that replicates data and co-
ordinates between the local stores. Figure 2a shows the
DIRECT storage stack, which accommodates unreliable
flash (flash that exposes high UBERs). There is exist-
ing work on how to make local file systems tolerate cor-
ruption errors (we survey some of these systems in §6).
However, there is no existing work on how to enable dis-
tributed storage systems, or even local key-value stores,
to tolerate bit corruption in a live production environ-
ment. DIRECT addresses these challenges.
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Figure 2: (a) DIRECT instruments cooperation between the local data stores and the distributed coordination layer to fix errors
in the local data store. (b) Within the local data store, bit errors can affect either data objects or metadata. There must be precise
semantics that define how recovery operations fixing data objects interact with write operations.
3.1 High Availability
Within the local data store, bit errors affect either ap-
plication data or application metadata, as shown in Fig-
ure 2b. Maintaining multiple copies of each piece of data
is the easiest way for a system to recover from bit errors.
Our observation is that this redundancy already exists for
application data!
Distributed Redundancy. Distributed storage systems
typically use replication [22] or erasure coding [34, 56]
to store redundant copies of data. Hot data, which is
stored on flash storage, is typically replicated to avoid the
higher bandwidth and CPU consumption associated with
reconstructing erasure coded blocks [34]. In addition,
erasure coding is not used for storage applications requir-
ing fine-grained data access such as RocksDB. Since dis-
tributed storage systems assume storage devices correct
device-level errors, they do not currently use replicas to
correct bit errors [29], even though this redundancy can
significantly boost bit error resilience.
Consider the following example. Suppose a data block
is replicated in each of the three data stores shown in Fig-
ure 2b. If the block has size B, and the uncorrectable bit
error rate (UBER) is E, then the expected number of er-
rors in the block will be B ·E. Since the block is repli-
cated across R different servers, the storage application
can recover the block from a remote server when an er-
ror occurs in at most R− 1 of its replicas. In this case,
the only way that the storage system would encounter an
application-observable read error is when at least one er-
ror exists in each of the copies of the block. Therefore,
the probability of an application-level read error can be
expressed as:
P[error] = (1− (1−E)B)R ≈ (E ·B)R
where we assume E ·B << 1 and use a Taylor series ap-
proximation.
Then for an UBER of E = 10−15, a block size of
B = 128 MB (typical of distributed file systems), and a
replication factor of R = 3, the probability of error is
Probability of Application-Observable Error
UBER Block Recovery Chunk Recovery
10−10 1 ·10−3 3 ·10−10
10−15 1 ·10−18 1 ·10−28
Table 1: Probability of application-observable error comparing
block-by-block recovery to chunk-by-chunk recovery, with an
UBER of 10−10, and 10−15. Finer granularity recovery pro-
vides significantly higher protection against corruptions.
10−18 (files are measured in bytes, while UBER is in
bits). This effectively is three orders of magnitude lower
than the UBER of each local disk.
However, with relatively large blocks, the probability
of encountering at least one error in all block replicas
quickly increases as UBER increases. For example, for
an UBER of E = 10−10, the expected number of errors in
a single block will be B ·E = 0.1. Thus, the probability
of error in this case will be P[error] ≈ 0.001. We make
the observation that reducing E ·B, by reducing B, will
dramatically reduce the probability of error.
Minimizing Error Amplification. DIRECT captures
this intuition with error amplification (B in the previous
example), or the number of bytes required to recover a bit
error. DIRECT observes that the lower the error ampli-
fication, the lower the probability of error and the faster
recovery can occur. This similarly implies a shorter pe-
riod of time spent in degraded durability and thus higher
availability.
In the example above, suppose the system can recover
data at a finer granularity, for example, at chunk size C =
64 KB. Then a read error would occur if all three replicas
of the same chunk have at least one bit error. The revised
probability of read error is:
P[error] = 1− (1− (1− (1−E)C)R) BC
Assuming E ·C << 1, Taylor series approximation leads
to (1− (1−E)C)R) ≈ (E ·C)R, and assuming this value
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is much smaller than BC , the probability of an application-
observable error when correcting chunk-by-chunk is:
P[error]≈ (E ·C)R · B
C
When C = 64 KB and E = 10−10, this probability is 3 ·
10−10, which is much lower than the probability when
recovering at the block level (see Table 1).
In HDFS, chunk recovery is precisely what allows DI-
RECT to tolerate higher bit error rates. The RocksDB
data format is more complicated than the block format
discussed in this section, but DIRECT also isolates errors
to data blocks (∼ 8 KB) in RocksDB, and this is respon-
sible for significant improvements in recovery time.
Metadata Error Amplification. So far, we have dis-
cussed the effect of errors on data blocks. However, error
amplification can be even more severe if the error occurs
in local metadata. For example, a corrupted local key-
value store index can prevent a data store from starting
up, which can mean re-replication of hundreds of GBs
of data. Even though the likelihood of errors in meta-
data is statistically lower than in data blocks (metadata
typically takes up much less space than data), it requires
stronger local protection to minimize error amplification.
To address this problem, DIRECT either locally dupli-
cates metadata or applies local software error correction.
3.2 Correctness
Minimizing error amplification of data blocks and cor-
recting data from remote replicas enables performant,
live recovery of corrupted data blocks. However, DI-
RECT must also ensure recovery operations preserve
the correctness of the distributed storage system, which
might be dealing with concurrent write and read oper-
ations. For example, in Figure 2b, after both recovery
operation and write operation, the corrupted data block
is both fixed and has the “correct” data with respect to
consistency guarantees of the system.
Correct recovery is particularly difficult in RocksDB
because of key versioning. The versions of the corrupted
key-value pairs are not known, because the corruption
prevents the data from being read. Hence in order to
correctly recover corrupted key-value pairs, the system
must locate some consistent (up-to-date) version of each
pair. To do this, DIRECT forces recovery operations to
go through the Paxos log in ZippyDB, which can provide
correct ordering (§4.1.3).
3.3 DIRECT Policies
To summarize, DIRECT includes the following policies.
1. Systems must reduce error amplification of data ob-
jects and fix corruptions from remote replicas.
2. Systems must perform local metadata duplication to
avoid high recovery costs from metadata corruption.
3. Systems must ensure safe recovery semantics.
Note that the first and second policies apply exclu-
sively to the local data store and affect performance,
while the third policy requires that the local data store
interact with the distributed coordination layer to ensure
correctness during recovery.
4 Implementing DIRECT
To demonstrate the use of the DIRECT approach, we in-
tegrate it into two systems: ZippyDB, a distributed key-
value store backed by RocksDB, and HDFS, a popular
distributed file system.
4.1 ZippyDB-DIRECT
4.1.1 ZippyDB Overview
ZippyDB is a distributed key-value store used within
Facebook that is backed by RocksDB (i.e., RocksDB is
the local data store in Figure 2a). ZippyDB runs on tens
of thousands of flash servers at Facebook, which makes
it an ideal target for DIRECT. ZippyDB provides a repli-
cation layer on top of RocksDB. ZippyDB is logically
separated into shards, and each shard is fully replicated at
least three ways. Each shard has a primary replica as well
as a number of secondary replicas, wherein each replica
is backed by a separate RocksDB instance residing on
separate servers. Each ZippyDB server contains 100s of
shards, including both primary and secondary replicas.
Hence, each ZippyDB server actually contains a large
number of separate RocksDB instances.
ZippyDB runs a Paxos-based protocol for shard op-
erations to ensure consistency. The primary shard acts
as the leader for the Paxos entry, and each shard also
has a Paxos log to persist each Paxos entry. Writes are
considered durable when they are committed by a quo-
rum of shards, and write operations are applied to the
local RocksDB store in the order that they are commit-
ted. A separate service is responsible for monitoring the
primary and triggering Paxos role changes.
ZippyDB supports a variety of read consistencies de-
pending on the client service: (1) strongly consistent
reads, which go through the primary; (2) read-after-write
consistency, which can be served by any replica if the
client passes a Paxos entry to read-after; and (3) eventu-
ally consistent reads, which can go to any replica.
4.1.2 RocksDB Overview
RocksDB is a local key-value store that is based on a
log-structured merge (LSM) tree [54]. RocksDB batches
writes in-memory—each write receives a sequence num-
ber that enables key versioning—and flushes them into
immutable files of sorted key-value pairs called sorted
string table (SST) files. RocksDB SST files are com-
posed of individually checksummed blocks, each of
which can be a data block or a metadata block. The meta-
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Figure 3: RocksDB SST file format. Index block entries point
to keys in between data blocks, which means consecutive index
block entries will form a key range that contains all keys in the
sandwiched data block. DIRECT writes each metadata block
at least twice in-line (or uses an error correction code).
data blocks include index blocks that point to the keys at
the start of each data block (Figure 3) [11].
SST files are organized into levels. A key feature
of RocksDB and other LSM tree-backed stores is back-
ground compaction, which periodically scans SST files
and compacts them into lower levels, as well as performs
garbage collection on deleted and overwritten keys.
4.1.3 Implementing DIRECT
In ZippyDB, if a compaction encounters a corruption, an
entire server, which typically has 100s of gigabytes to
terabytes of data, will shutdown and attempt to drain its
RocksDB shards to another machine. Meanwhile, this
sudden crash causes spikes in error rates and increases
the load on other replicas while the server is recovering.
To make matters worse, the new server could reside in
a separate region, further delaying time to recovery. All
this leads to high error amplification: a single bit error
can cause the migration of terabytes of data.
Reducing Error Amplification of Data Blocks. We
observe that checksums in RocksDB are applied at the
data block level, so a data block is the smallest granu-
larity at which a bit error can be recovered. Data blocks
are lists of key-value pairs, and key-value pairs are repli-
cated at the ZippyDB layer. So if the metadata on an SST
file is correct (see below on how we protect per-SST file
metadata), a corrupted data block can be recovered by
fetching the pairs in the data block from another replica.
However, this is challenging for two reasons.
First, compactions are non-deterministic in RocksDB
and depend on a variety of factors such as available
disk space and how compaction threads are scheduled.
Hence, two replicas of the same RocksDB instance will
have a different set of SST files, making it impossible to
find an exact replica of the corrupted SST file, much less
the corrupted data block. Second, because the block is
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Write1 
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.                   
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WriteN
Write1 
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Figure 4: To serialize a patch properly, we add it as a request in
the Paxos log. If the patch request is serialized at point t, then it
must r fle t all entries t ′ < t (shaded). Furthermore, the patch
request is not batched with any writes to ensure atomicity.
corrupted, it is impossible to know the exact key-value
pairs that were stored in that block. Therefore, not only
do we not know what data to look for on the other replica,
we also don’t know where to find it.
Instead of repairing the exact keys that are lost, we
repair the corrupted data block by re-writing a larger key
range that covers the keys in the corrupted block. The
key range is determined from index blocks, which are a
type of metadata block that exist at the end of every SST
file and record a key in the range between consecutive
data blocks, as shown in Figure 3. Hence, consecutive
index block entries form a key range which is guaranteed
to contain the lost keys.
Unfortunately, just knowing the key range is not
enough: the existence of key versions in RocksDB and
quorum replication in ZippyDB compounds the problem.
In particular, a key must be recovered to a version greater
than or equal to the lost key version, which could mean
deleting it as key versions in RocksDB can be deletion
markers. Additionally, if we naı¨vely fetch key versions
from another replica, we may violate consistency.
Safe Recovery Semantics. To guide our recovery de-
sign, we introduce the following correctness require-
ment. Suppose we learn from the index blocks that we
must re-replicate key range [a,b]. This key range is re-
quested from another replica, which assembles a set of
fresh key-value pairs in [a,b], which we call a patch.
Safety Requirement: Immediately after patch inser-
tion, the database must be in a state that reflects some
prefix of the Paxos log. Furthermore, this prefix must in-
clude the Paxos entries that originally updated the cor-
rupted data block.
In other words, patch insertion must bring ZippyDB to
some consistent state after the versions of the corrupted
keys; otherwise, if the patch inserts prior versions of the
keys, then the database will appear to go backwards.
Because the Paxos log serializes updates to ZippyDB,
the cleanest way to find a prefix to recover up to is to
serialize the patch insertion via the Paxos log. Then if
patch insertion gets serialized as entry t in the log, the log
prefix of the patch must reflect all Paxos entries t ′ < t, as
shown in Figure 4. Serializing a patch at index t tells us
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exactly how to populate the patch. In particular, each key
in the patch must be recovered to the largest s < t such
that s is the index of a Paxos entry that updates that key.
Furthermore, patch insertion must be atomic. Other-
wise, it could be interleaved with updates to keys in the
patch, which would violate the safety requirement, be-
cause then the version of the key in the patch would not
reflect a prefix of t. This is actually a subtle point because
ZippyDB batches many writes into a single Paxos entry,
as shown in Figure 4. If patch insertion is batched with
other writes, then the patch will not reflect the writes that
are in front of it in the batch. Hence, we force the patch
insertion to be its own Paxos entry.
Even though it stores a relatively small amount of data,
the Paxos protocol itself can tolerate bit errors by writing
an additional entry per Paxos entry (for more informa-
tion, see PAR [18]).
Local Metadata Duplication. There are two flavors
of metadata in RocksDB: metadata files and metadata
blocks in SST files. Metadata files, such as a MANI-
FEST, OPTIONS, and CURRENT, are only read during
startup and then cached in memory. We can easily protect
these metadata files by locally replicating them, which
adds a minimal space overhead (on the order of kilobytes
per server). Other files such as LOG files don’t need to
protected, as they simply contain printed log statements
used for debugging.
Metadata blocks, however, must be protected because
the integrity of the recovery process depends on uncor-
rupted index blocks, and index blocks are not replicated
(since each local SST file is unique). We protect meta-
data blocks by writing them several times in-line in the
same SST file. In our implementation, we write each
metadata block twice1. Protecting metadata enables us
to isolate errors to a single data block, rather than invali-
dating an entire SST file.
4.1.4 DIRECT Recovery in ZippyDB
ZippyDB does not synchronously recover corrupted
blocks encountered in user reads. Instead, it returns the
error to the client, which will retry on a different replica,
and ZippyDB will then trigger a manual compaction in-
volving the file containing the corrupted data block.
ZippyDB triggers synchronous recovery only when a
corruption error occurs during compaction. Figure 5 de-
picts this process. Importantly, we do not release a com-
paction’s output files until the recovery procedure fin-
ishes; otherwise, stale key versions may reappear in the
key ranges still undergoing recovery. Fortunately, be-
cause compaction is a background process, we can wait
for recovery without affecting client operations.
1For increased protection, metadata blocks can be locally replicated
more than twice or protected with software error correction.
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Figure 5: Recovering a corrupted RocksDB data block in-
volves the following steps: (1) RocksDB compaction iterator
determines the corrupted key range based on the index blocks
of the SST files and reports this to ZippyDB. (2) The ZippyDB
shard reports this error to the primary for that replica. (3) The
primary shard adds the patch request to the Paxos log. (4) The
Paxos engine replicates the request to all replicas. (5) Each
replica tries to process the patch request. If the processing shard
is not the corrupted shard, then it prepares a patch from its local
RocksDB state and sends it to the corrupted shard. If the pro-
cessing shard is the corrupted shard, then it waits for a patch
from any of the other replicas. (6) The corrupted shard applies
the fresh patch to its local RocksDB store.
Step (1) is implemented entirely within RocksDB. In
particular, a RocksDB compaction iterator will record a
corrupted key range when it’s encountered, and then skip
it to continue scanning. At the end of the iterator’s life-
time, ZippyDB is notified about the corrupted key range.
If there are multiple corrupt key ranges, they are batched
into a single patch request.
Step (3) must go through the primary because the pri-
mary is the only shard that can propose entries to the
Paxos log. Note that this does not mean primaries cannot
recover from corrupted data blocks. The patch request
that goes in the Paxos log is simply a no-op that reserves
a point of reference for the recovery procedure and in-
cludes information necessary for recovery, such as the
corrupted key ranges and the ID of the corrupted shard.
Any replica that encounters the patch request in the log
is by definition up-to-date to that point in the Paxos log,
which means any replica that isn’t the corrupted replica
can send a patch to the corrupted replica.
In Step (5), an uncorrupted replica creates a patch on
the affected key range with a RocksDB iterator. Note
that it might encounter a bit corruption while assembling
the patch. In practice the probability of this is very small
because the number of keys covered by the patch is on
the order of kilobytes (§5.1). However, if a corruption is
encountered while assembling a patch, the replica simply
does not send a patch. Therefore, for the patch request
to fail, both (or more, if the replication factor is more
than 3) uncorrupted replicas will have to encounter a bit
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corruption, and this probability is low (see Table 1).
Step (6) is also implemented at the RocksDB level.
When a replica applies a patch, simply inserting all the
key-value pairs present in the patch is insufficient be-
cause of deleted keys. In particular, any key present in
the requested key range and not present in the patch is
an implicit delete. Therefore, to apply a patch, the cor-
rupted shard must also delete any keys that it can see that
aren’t present in the patch. This case is possible because
RocksDB deletes keys by inserting a tombstone value,
which is inlined in SST files. Hence the corrupted data
block may contain tombstone operators that delete a key,
and these must be preserved.
4.1.5 Invalidating Snapshots
In RocksDB, users can request snapshots, which are rep-
resented by a sequence number. Then, for as long as
the snapshot with sequence number s is active, RocksDB
will not delete any version, s′, of a key where s′ is the
greatest version of the key such that s′< s. ZippyDB uses
RocksDB snapshots to execute transactions. If RocksDB
invalidates a snapshot, then the transaction using that
snapshot will abort and retry.
A subtle side-effect of a corrupted data block is snap-
shot corruption. For example, suppose the RocksDB
store has a snapshot at sequence number 100 and the cor-
rupted data block contains a key with sequence number
90. For safety, we need to invalidate any snapshots that
could have been affected by the corrupted key range. Be-
cause the data block is corrupted, it cannot be read, so
we do not know whether this corruption affects snapshot
100. For now, we take the obviously correct approach
and invalidate all local snapshots of the RocksDB shard
affected by the corruption. In practice, this is reasonable
because most RocksDB snapshots have short lifetimes.
4.2 HDFS-DIRECT
4.2.1 HDFS Overview.
HDFS is a distributed file system that is designed for stor-
ing large files that are sequentially written and read. Files
are divided into 128MB blocks, and HDFS replicates and
reads at the block level.
HDFS servers have three main roles: NameNode,
JournalNode, and DataNode. The NameNode and Jour-
nalNodes store cluster metadata such as the cluster di-
rectory structure and mappings from block to DataNode.
JournalNodes quorum-replicate updates to this metadata
by running a protocol similar to Multi-Paxos; there is no
leader election because the NameNode is the leader, and
HDFS deployments run a ZooKeeper service to ensure
there is always one live NameNode [3].
As with the Paxos log of ZippyDB, we can protect
against bit errors in the JournalNode by adding an ad-
ditional entry [18]. To prevent the JournalNode logs
from growing indefinitely, the NameNode takes periodic
snapshots of the stored metadata. We divide the snap-
shots into 512 byte chunks and compute a CRC32 check-
sum for each chunk, just as with data blocks. During
NameNode recovery, which runs only during recovery
or startup mode and not during the steady-state, snapshot
corruptions can be fixed by fetching the corresponding
chunk from the standby NameNode, which acts as a hot
NameNode backup.
DataNodes store actual HDFS data blocks (they are
the local data stores in Figure 2), and they respond to
client requests to read blocks. If a client encounters er-
rors while reading a block, it will continue trying other
DataNodes from the offset of the error until it can read
the entire block. Once it encounters an error on a Data-
Node, the client will not try that node again. If there are
no more DataNodes and the block is not fully read, the
read fails and that block is considered missing.
Additionally, HDFS has a configurable background
“block scanner” that periodically scans data blocks and
reports corrupted blocks for re-replication. But the de-
fault scan interval is three weeks, and even if the peri-
odic scan does catch bit errors before the next read of a
block, the NameNode can only recover at the 128 MB
block granularity. If there is a bit error in every replica
of a block, then HDFS cannot recover the block.
4.2.2 Implementing DIRECT
Reducing Error Amplification of Data Blocks We
leverage the observation that HDFS checksums every
512 bytes in each 128 MB data block. Corruptions
thus can be narrowed down to a 512 byte chunk; veri-
fying checksums adds no overhead, because by default
HDFS will verify checksums during every block read.
For streaming performance, the smallest-size buffer that
is streamed during a data block read is 64 KB, so we
actually repair 64 KB everytime there is a corruption.
To mask corruption errors from clients, we repair a data
block synchronously during a read. Under DIRECT, the
full read (and recovery) protocol is the following.
Each 128 MB block in HDFS is replicated on three
DataNodes, call them A,B,C. An HDFS read of a 128
MB block is routed to one of these DataNodes, say A.
A will stream the block to the client in 64 KB chunks,
verifying checksums before it sends a chunk. If there is a
checksum error in a 64 KB chunk, then A will attempt to
repair the chunk by requesting the 64 KB chunk from B.
If the chunk sent by B also contains a corruption, then the
checksum will be incorrect, and A will request the chunk
from C (see Figure 6a).
If C also sends a corrupted chunk, then A will attempt
to construct a correct version of the chunk through bit-
by-bit majority voting: the value of a bit in the chunk
is the majority vote across the three versions provided
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(a) A will attempt to correct a corrupted chunk by requesting it
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(b) If the chunk is corrupted on all datanodes, then A will at-
tempt majority voting to reconstruct a clean chunk.
Figure 6: DataNodes will stream the read of a block in 64 KB
chunks. When it encounters a checksum failure, a DataNode
will try to repair the individual chunk.
by A, B, and C. The idea behind majority voting is that
the probability that the corruptions on A, B, and C af-
fect the same byte is very low, which means a majority
vote across the three versions of the byte should end up
with the correct data. After reconstructing the chunk via
majority voting (Figure 6b), A will verify the checksums
again; if the checksums fail, then the read fails. As we
show in Section 5.2, UBERs have to be at least 10−8 in
order for majority voting failures to affect read failures,
which allows HDFS-DIRECT to tolerate on the order of
a million times more bit errors than HDFS.
Note that bit-by-bit majority voting is possible only
if the device can return pages with uncorrectable errors
(see §6); otherwise, our HDFS implementation simply
uses chunk-by-chunk recovery. Furthermore, for major-
ity voting to add significant recovery power over chunk-
by-chunk recovery, the number of corrupt bits returned
by the device should be relatively small compared to the
page size; the number of corrupt bits on a device page
after running hardware ECC is dependent on the ECC
function and its implementation.
Safe Recovery Semantics. Safety is straightforward in
HDFS because data blocks are immutable once written,
so there are never in-place updates that will conflict with
chunk recovery. Before a client does a block read, it first
contacts the NameNode to get the DataNode IDs of all
the DataNodes on which the block is replicated. When a
client sends a block read request to a DataNode, it also
sends this set of IDs. Because blocks are immutable,
these IDs are guaranteed to be correct replicas of the
block, if they exist. It could be that a concurrent oper-
ation has deleted the block. In this case, if chunk recov-
ery cannot find the block on another DataNode because
it has been deleted, then it cannot perform recovery, so it
will return the original checksum error to the client. This
is correct, because there is no guarantee in HDFS that
concurrent read operations should see the instantaneous
deletion of a block.
Local Metadata Duplication. Each role in HDFS has
local metadata files that must be correct, otherwise the
role cannot be started. These files include a VERSION
file, as well as special files on the NameNode and Jour-
nalNode. For example, the NameNode stores a special
file (seen-txid) which contains a high-water mark
transaction ID. Any correct recovery of the existing clus-
ter must be able to recover up to at least this transaction.
Metadata files are not currently protected in HDFS;
thus, a single corruption will prevent the role from start-
ing. To implement DIRECT, we add a standard CRC32
checksum at the beginning of each file and replicate the
file twice so that there are actually three copies of the file
on disk. If there is a checksum error when the file is read,
the recovery protocol will visit each of the copies until it
finds one with a correct checksum.
5 Evaluation
This section addresses the three following questions. (1)
What is the highest UBER that ZippyDB and HDFS can
tolerate with DIRECT? (2) How is ZippyDB’s recovery
time affected by DIRECT? (3) What are the overheads of
DIRECT on steady-state requests in HDFS?
Experimental Setup. To evaluate ZippyDB, we set up
a cluster of Facebook servers that capture and duplicate
live traffic from a heavily loaded service used in comput-
ing user feeds. To evaluate HDFS, we run experiments
on a cluster of 10 machines (each with a role described
below) each with 8 ARMv8 cores at 2.4 GHz, 96 GB of
RAM, and 120 GB of flash. In the cluster, we allocate
one machine each for a NameNode, standby NameNode,
and JournalNode, and three machines run the DataNode
role. Four machines act as HDFS clients. HDFS exper-
iments have a load and read phase: in the load phase,
we load the cluster with 200, 128MB files with random
data. In the read phase, clients randomly select files to
read. After the load phase, we clear the page cache.
Error Injection. To simulate UBERs, we inject bit er-
rors into the files of both systems. In ZippyDB, we inject
errors with a custom RocksDB environment that flips bits
as they are read from a file. In HDFS, we run a script in
between the load and read phases that flips bits in on-
disk files and flushes them. For an UBER of µ , e.g.
µ = 10−11, we inject errors at the rate of 1 bit flip per
1/µ bits read. We tested with UBERs higher than the
manufacturer advertised 10−15 to test the system’s per-
formance under high error rates, and so that we can mea-
sure enough bit errors during an experiment time of 12
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Figure 7: Read error rates over time in ZippyDB and ZippyDB-DIRECT, for a variety of UBERs.
UBER Compaction Errors per Hour per Server
10−10 0.1991±0.1077
10−11 0.0621±0.0455
10−12 0.0038±0.0035
10−13 0.0003±0.0005
Table 2: Number of compaction errors encountered by Zip-
pyDB. ZippyDB-DIRECT is able to fix these errors, while the
server crashes in ZippyDB.
hours rather than several days (or years)2.
5.1 ZippyDB
UBER Tolerance. One main difference between un-
modified ZippyDB and ZippyDB-DIRECT is that
ZippyDB-DIRECT avoids crashing when encountering
a bit error. To characterize how many server crashes
are mitigated with DIRECT, we measured the average
rate of compaction errors per hour per server, over 12
hours. The results are shown in Table 2. Figure 7 shows
the read error rate over time of both systems for a vari-
ety of UBERs. Note that the error rate patterns across
UBERs are different because they are run during differ-
ent time intervals, so each UBER experiment sees differ-
ent traffic. The error rate is much higher for ZippyDB
than ZippyDB-DIRECT because not only do clients see
errors from regular read operations, but also they experi-
ence the spike in errors when a server shuts down due to
a compaction corruption. This is true across the range of
evaluated UBERs.
Time Spent in Reduced Durability. With DIRECT, we
also seek to minimize the amount of time spent in re-
duced durability to decrease the likelihood of simultane-
ous replica failures. Figure 8 shows a CDF of the time
it takes to recover from compaction errors in ZippyDB-
DIRECT. The graph shows the amount of time it takes
2 Note that an UBER 10−11 is 10,000× higher than 10−15
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Figure 8: CDF of compaction recovery latencies in ZippyDB-
DIRECT. ZippyDB-DIRECT takes milliseconds to recover
from corruptions, while ZippyDB takes minutes.
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Figure 9: CDF of patch sizes generated during the ZippyDB-
DIRECT recovery process. The patch size is small, which
means low error amplification.
for replicas to process the Paxos log up until the patch
request, as well as the overhead of constructing and in-
serting the patch. With DIRECT, this recovery time is on
the order of milliseconds.
In contrast, the period of reduced durability in unmod-
ified ZippyDB due to a compaction error is on the order
of minutes, depending on the amount of data stored in
the crashed ZippyDB server. This is directly due to the
high error amplification of ZippyDB, which invalidates
100s of RocksDB shards due to a single compaction bit
error. With DIRECT, ZippyDB can reduce its recovery
time due to a bit error by around 10,000x!
We also found that the recovery latency is dependent
on the size of the patch required to correct the corrupted
key range. Figure 9 presents a CDF of the size of the
patches generated during the recovery process. Patch
size is also interesting because the recovery mechanism
described in Section 4.1.4 recovers a range of keys, since
the exact keys on the corrupted data block are impossible
to identify. As we see in Figure 9, even though recover-
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UBER ZippyDB (CPU con-
sumption)
ZippyDB-DIRECT
(CPU consumption)
10−10 100% 80%
10−11 100% 51%
10−12 100% 51%
Table 3: CPU consumption of ZippyDB and ZippyDB-
DIRECT (lower is better), normalized to ZippyDB.
ing a range can in theory increase error amplification, the
number of keys required for recovery is still low.
Figure 9 also confirms that as the UBER increases,
patch sizes increase due to more key ranges getting cor-
rupted during a single compaction operation.
Reduced CPU Consumption. Due to its more efficient
recovery from bit corruptions, ZippyDB-DIRECT con-
sumes much less CPU than ZippyDB, as shown in Ta-
ble 3. We don’t report statistics for UBER = 10−13 be-
cause the errors are infrequent. CPU usage is higher
in ZippyDB mostly due to handling redirected client re-
quests as well as shard restarts.
5.2 HDFS
UBER Tolerance. The main advantage of HDFS-
DIRECT over HDFS is the ability to tolerate much
higher UBERs with chunk-level recovery. Figure 10
reports block read error rates of HDFS with varying
UBERs. This read error is also considered data loss in
HDFS, because the data is unreadable (and hence unre-
coverable) even after trying all 3 replicas. The figure
shows both the measured read error on our HDFS exper-
imental setup, as well as the computed read error based
on the computation presented in §3.1. The experimen-
tal read error is collected by running thousands of file
reads and measuring how many fail. Within the UBER
range in which we could effectively measure errors, the
read errors we measured were similar to the computed re-
sults. We do not present experimental read error rates for
HDFS-DIRECT, because the read error rates are too low
to be measured for the UBERs tested in Figure 10. The
figure also presents the expected error rates for HDFS-
DIRECT using chunk-by-chunk recovery and bit-by-bit
majority. As expected, bit-by-bit majority reduces the
read error rate due to its lower error amplification (it can
recover bit-by-bit). Both our analysis and the experi-
mental results show that HDFS-DIRECT can tolerate a
10,000-100,000x higher UBER and maintain the same
read error rate!
Overhead of DIRECT. Table 4 shows the throughput
of both systems, measured by saturating the DataNodes
with four, 64-threaded clients that are continuously read-
ing random files. The throughput of HDFS goes to zero
at an UBER of 10−8, because it cannot complete any
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Figure 10: Read error rate for HDFS with varying UBER.
The HDFS (analyzed), HDFS-DIRECT Chunk and HDFS-
DIRECT Majority are all computed using the formula in §3.1.
HDFS-DIRECT Chunk is based on chunk-by-chunk recovery,
while HDFS-DIRECT Majority is computed on bit-by-bit ma-
jority. Bit-by-bit majority provides lower error rates due to its
lower recovery amplification. HDFS (Measured) is the mea-
sured HDFS read errors. With HDFS-DIRECT we could not
measure any level of read errors until UBERs of 10−4.
UBER HDFS throughput
[GB/s]
HDFS-DIRECT
throughput [GB/s]
10−7 0.00±0.00 2.09±0.08
10−8 0.00±0.00 2.56±0.09
10−9 2.46±0.08 2.55±0.07
10−10 2.89±0.10 2.84±0.07
No errors 2.83±0.07 2.88±0.07
Table 4: Throughput of HDFS and HDFS-DIRECT. At
UBER= 10−8, HDFS throughput collapses due to bit errors.
reads due to corruption errors. Such failures do not occur
in HDFS-DIRECT, although its throughput decreases
modestly as UBER increases due to the overhead of syn-
chronously repairing corrupt chunks during reads.
For HDFS-DIRECT, we are also interested in latency
incurred by synchronous chunk recovery. We compare
the CDF of read latencies of 128 MB blocks for dif-
ferent UBERs in Figure 11. The higher the UBER, the
more chunk recovery requests that need to be made dur-
ing a block read and the longer these requests will take.
The results in Figure 11 (and Table 4) highlight the fine-
grained tradeoff between performance and recoverabil-
ity that is exposed by DIRECT. We also report HDFS
read latencies, but there is little difference across UBERs
because only latency for successful block reads are in-
cluded. Note that the CDF for HDFS does not include
UBERs higher than 10−8, since at those error rates HDFS
cannot read a block without an error.
6 Discussion
Local File System Error Tolerance. Distributed stor-
age systems run on top of local file systems. There-
fore, when devices exhibit higher UBERs, local file sys-
tems also experience higher UBERs. DIRECT protects
application-level metadata and data, which are just data
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Figure 11: Read latencies (128 MB) of HDFS and HDFS-
DIRECT. All reads fail in HDFS an UBER of 10−8 and higher.
blocks at the local file system level. Protecting local
file system metadata (such as inodes, the FS journal,
etc.) is beyond the scope of this paper. Several ex-
isting file systems protect metadata against bit corrup-
tions [2, 15, 16, 32, 41, 55, 62]. The general approach
is to add checksums to file system metadata and locally
replicate it for error correction. Another approach is to
use more reliable hardware for metadata, and less reli-
able hardware for data blocks [41].
Support for DIRECT. DIRECT does not require any
hardware support. However, a couple of simple device-
level mechanisms would help datacenter operators run
devices past their manufacturer defined UBER. First, it
would be beneficial if devices have a less aggressive “bad
block policy”, which is a firmware protocol for retiring
blocks once they reach some heuristic-defined level of
errors. Second, it would be beneficial if devices return
the content of pages, even if they have an error. This en-
ables distributed storage applications to minimize their
recovery amplification, since they can recover data at a
granularity smaller than a device page (e.g., on a bit-by-
bit level using majority voting). This is not a hard re-
quirement, since as we showed in §3.1 even recovering
at a device page level (e.g., 4-8 KB) provides significant
benefits. In case corrupt pages cannot be read, it is im-
portant to guarantee that when duplicating metadata the
copies are stored on separate physical pages. Otherwise,
a page error could invalidate all copies of the metadata.
7 Related Work
Related work is divided into two main parts: systems that
deal with device errors using software mechanisms or by
applying more aggressive hardware mechanisms.
Software-level Redundancy. DIRECT is related to
Protocol Aware Recovery (PAR) [18], which recently
demonstrated how consensus-based protocols can be
adapted to address bit-level errors. Unlike PAR, which
only addresses consensus protocols, our work tackles bit-
level errors in general purpose storage systems. We also
show how increasing the resiliency to bit-level errors can
significantly reduce storage costs and improve live re-
covery speed in datacenter environments.
FlexECC [35] and Duracache [46] are flash-based key-
value caches that use less reliable disks by treating de-
vices errors as cache misses. D-GRAID is a RAID
storage system that gracefully degrades by minimizing
the amount of data needed to recover from bit cor-
ruptions [58]. There is a large number of distributed
storage systems that use inexpensive, unreliable hard-
ware, while providing consistency and reliability guar-
antees [21, 26, 30]. However, these systems treat bit cor-
ruptions similar to entire-node failures and suffer from
high recovery amplification.
There is a large body of work on finding errors in the
way both local file systems and distributed file systems
handle disk corruptions [29]. These efforts are orthogo-
nal to our work, because they focus on correctness flaws
of existing systems under disk corruptions, while we fo-
cus on how far we can push disk error rates without com-
promising performance (while maintaining correctness).
Research on hardening local file systems to tolerate disk
errors supports our vision of less reliable disks, because
it shows that it is possible to protect a local file system
from disk bit errors [2, 15, 16, 32, 41, 55, 62].
Hardware-level Redundancy. Several studies explore
extending SSD lifetime via more aggressive or adaptive
hardware error correction. Tanakamuru et al. [60] pro-
pose adapting codeword size based on the SSD’s dy-
namic device wear level to improve SSD lifetime. Cai
et al. [25] and Liu et al. [47] introduce techniques to dy-
namically learn and adjust the cell voltage levels based
on retention age. Zhao et al. [64] propose using the soft
information with LDPC error correction to increase life-
time. Our approach is different: instead of improving
hardware-based error correction, we leverage existing
software-based redundancy to address bit-level errors.
8 Conclusion
This paper presents DIRECT, a set of policies that use
the inherent redundancy that exists in distributed storage
applications for live recovery of bit corruptions.
We can extend the approach of handling error correc-
tion in the distributed storage layer in several directions.
First, distributed storage systems can control the level of
error correction depending on data type. For example,
some data types may be more sensitive to bit corruptions
(e.g., critical metadata), while others may not. Second,
distributed storage system can control hardware mecha-
nisms that influence the performance of the device. For
example, storing fewer bits per cell generally reduces the
latency of the device (at the expense of its capacity). Cer-
tain applications may prefer for to use a hybrid of low
latency and low capacity devices for hot data, while re-
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serving the high capacity devices for colder data.
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